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Executive Overreach by Minority Governments in India
Madhav S. Aney⇤ and Shubhankar Dam†
December 4, 2014
Abstract
A provision in the Indian constitution allows the executive to make laws in the event one
of the two houses of parliament is not in session. This provision was intended to allow the
executive to act in case there’s an immediate legislative necessity and the parliament cannot
be convened. Using a bargaining model with asymmetric information we show how parties
within the parliament may reach an agreement on legislations when the ruling party does not
command a majority (minority government). The model makes predictions about lawmaking
patterns by the legislature when the parliament is in session, and ordinances by the executive
when the parliament is not in session. Our three empirical findings are consistent with this
model. First we find a lack of correlation between legislations and ordinances for majority
governments but a negative correlation for minority governments as parliament is substituted
out by the executive when the government lacks the numbers in parliament. Second, we find
that minority governments are less successful in converting ordinances into parliamentary
legislation. Third, we find that the spacing of ordinances within a break is skewed towards the
start of the break for minority governments as they rush to pass ordinances when parliament
goes out of session. These results indicate that contrary to constitutional mandate, ordinances
have been used by governments to bypass parliament when they lack the numbers there. This
strengthens executive power at the expense of the legislature and this may have long run
institutional consequences.1
1 Introduction
Article 123 in the Indian Constitution authorises the President, the constitutional head of
State, to promulgate laws known as “ordinances”. The President may do so only if at least
one House of Parliament is not in session. Also, circumstances must be such that immediate
action is necessary. The President’s role though is a formal one. In keeping with India’s
⇤School of Economics, Singapore Management University. Corresponding author. Email: madhavsa@smu.edu.sg
†School of Law, Singapore Management University.
1We thank Lim Hui Jie for excellent research assistance.
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parliamentary model of governance, the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister de-
cide if an ordinance is necessary, and draft its content. Because ordinances are similar to
parliamentary legislation, Article 123 confers primary legislative powers on the executive;
ministers may e↵ectively enact parliamentary legislation without involving Parliament. How
has the executive in invoked this power to legislate? This paper analyses how the ordinance
mechanism has been put to varying use by majority and minority governments in India.
Parliamentary systems may have either majority or minority governments. Minority gov-
ernments are sort of an aberration. They lack majority support in the legislature by definition,
and yet hold the reigns of powers. Much of the scholarship in political science suggests that
minority governments produce di↵erent legislative outcomes compared to majority govern-
ments.
On one hand, Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that, the size and persistence of budget
deficits in the industrial countries is the greater with divided government. This is especially
true, they argue, of governments that lasted less than three years. They argue that such
short tenures of minority governments make indiscriminate spending more likely because
agreements among coalition partners are di cult to achieve in that duration. Coalition
partners may prefer an overall reduction in budget deficits, but their specific budget-cutting
priorities are likely to vary. And the veto power of even small parties in coalition governments
means that reductions or austerity is unlikely; the status quo – high deficits – is the most
likely outcome. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) use the same data to make a narrower claim: Large
and persistent budget deficits particularly correlate with minority governments. The number
of coalition partners matter less, they argue; rather, the status of governments in Parliament
a↵ects their ability to reduce deficits.
On the other hand, Martin and Vanberg (2004), argue that the relevance of Parliament to
the legislative process increases when coalition governments are in power. Coalition partners
often use the parliamentary process to “moderate” policy proposals that are inimical to their
electoral fortunes. On the other hand they argue that having a parliamentary majority
leads to the executive being stronger and the parliament becoming less relevant for shaping
legislations.
To motivate our paper we begin with table 2 where we present a stylized fact about how
minority and majority governments di↵er in passing laws through ordinances. In this table
we observe that minority governments pass 0.94 more ordinances in each session compared to
majority governments. We observe that this relationship is robust even when we control for
the length of time when the parliament is not in session. In columns (3) and (4) we observe
that this finding remains robust when we use the fraction of seats held by the single largest
party rather than a dummy for majority government (which takes value 1 when the sum of
the shares of all parties in government exceeds 1/2). Finally we see a reverse pattern for
bills passed in parliament – majority governments pass 5.25 more bills on average per session
compared to minority governments. These results are statistically significant and suggests
that there are important di↵erences between majority and minority governments in terms of
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relevant the parliament is for shaping legislation.
In what follows we first present the institutional details in section 2. We construct a
model that explains this phenomenon and makes further predictions about the di↵erences in
the patterns of ordinance making between majority and minority governments. This model
and its extensions are presented in sections 3 and 4. In section 5 we present our empirical
results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
Separation of powers is a key feature of modern constitutions. Often associated with the
writings of John Locke and Montesquieu, the concept mandates separate but interdependent
powers among the three principal organs of a State, that is the legislature, the executing
and the judiciary. The separation, it is commonly argued, promotes e ciency and protects
liberty better.2 A neat division, however, is an ideal: The complexities of administering
governments often compel functional compromises. As a result, constitutions occasionally
confer legislative powers on the executive and executive powers on the legislature. Shared
legislative powers between the legislature and the executive in the Indian Constitution reflect
one such compromise.
Article 123 authorises the Council of Ministers to e↵ectively enact parliamentary legis-
lation.3 Yet this mechanism is not meant to function like a parallel Parliament. Certain
procedural and substantive conditions must be met both before ordinances may be promul-
gated. First, India has a bicameral system, and ordinances are impermissible if both Houses
of Parliament are in session. They may be promulgated only if at least one House of Par-
liament is not in session. In other words, procedurally speaking, if the ordinary mechanism
to legislate is available, the Council of Ministers cannot resort to ordinances. Secondly, the
Council of Ministers must be satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for
[it] to take immediate action. This is a substantive requirement. Ministers cannot invoke
Article 123 merely because it is convenient to do so; the threshold of “immediacy” must be
met. The parliamentary Rules of Procedure also treat this requirement seriously. The Rules,
for example, mandate that a statement explaining the necessity for an ordinance must be laid
before both Houses of Parliament once the latter reconvene.
What counts as circumstances that make it necessary to take immediate action is not
readily clear. Notice that the substantive condition has two components; one about timing,
the other about threshold. First, circumstances [must] exist. Read narrowly, this may be mean
that circumstances that justify the promulgation of an ordinance must exist at a point in time
when at least one House of Parliament is not in session. If the circumstances arose before
Parliament broke up that is, Parliament was aware of the circumstances before going into
2Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) show how in an incomplete contracts setting, separation of powers can
create a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature leading to information revelation and higher
welfare for the electorate.
3See section A for the full text of Article 123.
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recess then an ordinance to address those circumstances is impermissible. A wider reading of
existence, however, would permit ordinances under this second scenario. It would mean that
as long as circumstances exist, irrespective of when they arose, ordinances are permissible if
at least one House of Parliament is not in session. The second component has to do with the
threshold of such a circumstance. What sort of circumstances must exist before an ordinance
may be promulgated? Article 123 says that the circumstances must be such that renders it
necessary to take immediate action. The Supreme Court has taken the view that the Council
of Ministers are the sole judge of whether an ordinance is immediately necessary; the court will
not second guess ministerial assessments (R. C. Cooper v Union of India 1970). Consequently,
in India today, Council Of Ministers decide if circumstances are such that makes it necessary
to take immediate action. This has important implications for the ordinance mechanism. A
government that is unsure of securing a majority support in Parliament for a particular Bill
may resort to an ordinance and, thereby, circumvent Parliament. Similarly, a government
that wants to avoid public debate on a Bill at least initially may promulgate an ordinance at
a point when Parliament is not in session. Or governments may choose to take the ordinance
route to pursue reforms that are politically unpalatable and set the agenda in a way that
makes it di cult for Parliament to reverse course later on.
Ordinances are an exceptional arrangement, and they have important implications for
the parliamentary system as a whole. Yet the Constituent Assembly – the body tasked
with framing Indias Constitution – had remarkably little to say about it. In 1949, broadly
two justifications were o↵ered during the debates. Some members justified the provision
on grounds of slow transport. Parliament would not be in session always, and in case of
legislative urgency, it would not be possible, to gather members at short notice (Constituent
Assembly Debates, 23 May 1949, p. 206).4 Therefore, an alternative arrangement, albeit
for a temporary duration, was necessary. Second, some members insisted that there was no
likelihood of abuse. The Council of Ministers, they argued, were representatives of the people,
and an abuse of this provision would be electorally costly. In addition, the President would
act as a check against the unnecessary use of this extraordinary power (p. 212). Mostly
importantly, to the charge that the executive might arrogate to itself [legislative] powers
and postpone calling the Parliament, the fear, some members argued, was unfounded. The
Council of Ministers, to remain in power, must enjoy the confidence of the Lower House of
Parliament, and improper use of the provision would necessarily invite censure of that House
(pp. 214-215). With that, the provision was voted into the Constitution.
It is worth pointing out that the few members who opposed the provision and the many
who defended it, spoke of the executive in monolithic terms. The executive in a parliamentary
system may be of many kinds, but fundamentally it is either a majority or a minority gov-
ernment. With majority governments, the question of parliamentary censure does not arise,
or rarely arises. The party that is in power, by definition, is also in a majority in Parliament.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the party in power would be censured by its own members in
4The Constituent Assembly debate are publicly available on the Parliament of India website.
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Parliament. With minority governments, the challenge is a di↵erent one. This provision may
indeed incentivise minority governments to legislate without involving Parliament. While the
possibility of censuring such governments is real (given their lack of majority in Parliament),
the provision o↵ers a method by which to bring legislation into existence that may not neces-
sarily enjoy parliamentary support. These concerns, however, were not properly articulated.
Both sides in the debate assumed a generic executive, failing to notice that a parliamentary
system may have di↵erent kinds of governments and they may opt to invoke Article 123 for
altogether di↵erent reasons.5
3 Model
A particular legislative agenda arises at the start of each session. This agenda is a function
of s. To give a concrete example due to popular discontent over inequality a demand for an
increase in the top marginal tax rate on income may arise. The bill based on such a legislative
necessity will be enacted with a particular s, which in this case would be the new tax rate
that is proposed in the bill.
The bill if enacted gives the government a payo↵ of ug(s) and coalition partners a payo↵ of
uc(s). We assume that the preferences of the government and the potential coalition partners
are continuous and single peaked in s. Without loss of generality we assume that s > s where
s and s are the respective peaks for the government and the coalition. We assume that these
are common knowledge.
If the bill is unable to pass, the government can promulgate it as an ordinance. The
government’s payo↵, if it takes the ordinance route, is discounted by a random variable ⇥
which takes values 1 or ✓ 2 (0, 1) with probability q and 1   q respectively. ⇥ is a reduced
form way of capturing several things. First, it captures the impatience of the government
when it comes to legislation. It may also indicate how reluctant the a government is to pass
the bill as an ordinance. In particular a type ✓ government feels some reluctance going the
ordinance route whereas a type 1 government feels no such reluctance. More importantly since
an ordinance needs to be continually re-promulgated or eventually passed by the parliament,
ceteris paribus the government naturally prefers to pass it through the parliament. The
government privately observes the realization of ⇥ whereas the coalition only knows the
distribution. We assume that the discount factor does not apply to the coalition. Adding a
discount factor that a↵ects the coalition complicates the analysis without adding anything
interesting by way of results.
Timing:
1. Legislative agenda arises and the government privately observes the realization of ⇥.
2. The coalition makes an o↵er to support some s.
5See Dam (2014) for more institutional details and a discussion on the constituent assembly debates.
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3. If the o↵er is accepted by the government, s becomes a law with the support of the
coalition.
4. If the o↵er is rejected, the government waits till the session lapses and then passes s
that it unilaterally chooses.
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium where the coalition o↵ers s⇤ 2 [s, s] that solves
ug(s⇤) = max{✓ug(s), ug(s)}. The government accepts this when ⇥ = ✓ and rejects otherwise
promulgating an ordinance with s = s in the event of rejection.
Proof. We begin with showing that any o↵er s that the coalition makes to the government
must be between [s, s]. To see this note that the preferences of both players are single peaked
with bliss points of s and s for the coalition and the government respectively. Hence both
the coalition and the government strictly prefer a policy of s over any policy with s < s and
similarly both prefer a policy of s over any policy with s > s. Hence by continuity u(s) in s,
for any policy not in [s, s] that is accepted by the government, the coalition can increase its
own payo↵ by o↵ering a policy in [s, s] that keeps the payo↵ of the government constant.
This game can be solved backwards. First note that if no agreement is reached the
government will promulgate an ordinance with s in the break. This gives a payo↵ of ⇥ug(s)
to the government and uc(s) to the coalition. Consequently the reservation payo↵ for the
government is ✓ug(s) when ⇥ = ✓ and ug(s) when ⇥ = 1. The reservation payo↵ of the
coalition is uc(s). Hence in an equilibrium any proposal of with s < s must be rejected by
the government when ⇥ = 1. Similarly when ⇥ = ✓ a proposal s is accepted if and only if
ug(s)   ✓ug(s).
The payo↵ of the coalition as a function of s is
(1  q)uc(s) + quc(s) for s 2 [s⇤, s]
uc(s) for s < s⇤.
(1)
Note that uc(s)   uc(s) for s 2 [s⇤, s]. Since uc(s) is strictly decreasing in s for s   s⇤, we
find that s⇤ is the unique value of s that maximizes this payo↵. Hence in equilibrium the
coalition always o↵ers s⇤ which is rejected when ⇥ = 1 and accepted when ⇥ = ✓. In case of
rejection the government passes an ordinance with s = s.
This game is repeated over N periods each time with a new legislative agenda and ⇥.
Note that when the government is in the majority, it does not require coalition support to
pass a bill. In this case the government always legislates s in parliament.
3.1 Testable Implications
Based on the model, when the government has majority and hence does not require support
from other parties in the parliament, it simply passes the bill s. In addition to this assume
that when there is a break, on each day of the break a legislative necessity arrives with some
probability which requires the government to promulgate an ordinance. To model this we use
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the random variable Yˆ which takes value 1 with probability p if the legislative necessity arises
and 0 otherwise each day for T days of the break. Whenever a legislative necessity arises the
government promulgates an ordinance.
Let X and Y be the random variables that represent the number of legislative agendas
that become salient in a session of parliament and its corresponding break. Both these follow
a binomial distribution. Let the length of the session and the break be T1 and T2 days
respectively. Then
P(X = x) =
✓
T1
x
◆
px(1  p)T1 x and E(X) = pT1 (2)
and similarly
P(Y = y) =
✓
T2
y
◆
py(1  p)T2 y and E(Y ) = pT2 (3)
We can derive the equilibrium distribution of bills and ordinances (X⇤ and Y ⇤) in a period.
Where the government has majority (B) this is simply
X⇤B = X and Y
⇤
B = Y. (4)
Since X⇤B and Y
⇤
B are independently distributed we have Cov(X
⇤
B, Y
⇤
B) = 0 in a majority
government. On the other hand when government is in minority (A) the distribution is given
by
X⇤A and Y
⇤
A = Y +X  X⇤A (5)
where X⇤A follows a binomial distribution on the support {0, 1, . . . X}. We observe that in
minority governments X⇤A and Y
⇤
A may not be independent. We can derive the covariance
Cov(X⇤A, Y
⇤
A) = EX,Y (Cov(X⇤A, Y ⇤A|X,Y )) + Cov(E(X⇤A|X,Y ),E(Y ⇤A|X,Y ))
=  EX,Y (Var(X⇤|X,Y )) + Cov((1  q)X,Y + qX)
=  q(1  q)E(X) + q(1  q)Var(X)
=  p2q(1  q)T1 < 0
(6)
Testable Implication 1. Bills passed in a session and ordinances promulgated in the subse-
quent break are negatively correlated during tenures of minority governments and uncorrelated
during the tenures of majority governments.
This is true since Cov(X⇤B, Y
⇤
B) = 0 and Cov(X
⇤
A, Y
⇤
A) < 0. Moreover since minority
governments use ordinances to promulgate bills that would be passed in parliament under
majority governments, we would expect them to do so early in the break. This gives us
testable implication 2.
Testable Implication 2. The likelihood of observing ordinances is decreasing in the number
of days elapsed from the start of the break for minority governments and uncorrelated for
majority governments.
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4 Bundling Bills
In our model we have assumed that bargaining over the content of each law is independent
of any other legislative necessities that arise during a session. This assumption may be
unreasonable since the coalition may make a simultaneous o↵er to support several bills.
The government would have to then consider the o↵er on di↵erent bills as one package. In
this section we extend our baseline model to allow for this possibility. We find that this
modification does not change testable implication 1 and 2.
To allow for maximum possibility of bundling bills together we make the extreme assump-
tion that the coalition waits till the last day of session to make a take it or leave it o↵er on all
legislative necessities that have arisen in that session.6 If the government rejects, no bills are
passed in that session and the government passes ordinances in the break. The government’s
acceptance of the o↵er depends on the realization of ⇥ across all legislative necessities in the
session.
The government receives a bill specific payo↵ from each bill i and this is denoted by uig(si).
Similarly the coalition receives a payo↵ of uic(si) for each bill. We continue to assume that si
and si are the preferred policy of the coalition and the government respectively and si < si
for all i. In addition we now assume that uig(si) and u
i
c(si) are strictly quasi-concave. If the
o↵er is rejected the government passes an ordinance with policy si for legislative necessity i.
Let L be the set of legislative necessities for which ⇥ = ✓, and the complement Lc contain
the legislative necessities with ⇥ = 1. The reservation payo↵ of the government is given by
✓
X
i2L
uig(si) +
X
i2Lc
uig(si). (7)
The government privately observes the state of the world L which can be one of 2X states since
there are X legislative necessities. For a proposed policy vector s with elements s1, s2, . . . sX ,
define
Ug(s) ⌘
X
i=1
uig(si) and Uc(s) ⌘
X
i=1
uic(si) (8)
Proposition 2. Assuming uig(si) and u
i
c(si) are strictly quasi-concave, there is a policy pro-
posal s⇤ that the coalition o↵ers and this is rejected by the government with positive probability.
Proof. We will first prove that there is a unique o↵er that the coalition makes. Next we will
show that this o↵er is associated with a strictly positive probability of rejection. We begin
with the observation that s⇤i   si for all i. This is true since if not the coalition could always
increase its payo↵ without increasing the probability of rejection by replacing any si < si by
si.
6If on the other hand the coalition made o↵ers that must be accepted or rejected as soon as legislative necessities
arise, it would limit the possibility of bundling these o↵ers with future legislative necessities that arise in the session,
and this takes us closer to out baseline model.
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The coalition’s problem is to find the s that maximizes
Uc(s) subject to Ug(s)   ✓
X
i2L
uig(si) +
X
i2Lc
uig(si). (9)
The realization of L is unobservable to the coalition. Note that in the optimal o↵er s⇤ this
constraint must bind for at least one realization of L. If not, the coalition can reduce some
si thereby increasing its payo↵ without increasing the probability of rejection. Hence we can
proceed by finding the optimal vector sL for each state possible state L. We now show that
that such a sL exists.
uig(si) and u
i
c(si) are quasi-concave in si and hence Ug(s) and Uc(s) are also quasi-concave.
Moreover there is a bliss point for the coalition and the government at s and s respectively.
Taking s as origin we see that the indi↵erence curves over for the aggregate coalition utility
Uc(s) are strictly concave with respect to the origin and the indi↵erence curves over for the
aggregate government utility Ug(s) are strictly convex with respect to the origin. Hence for a
given realization of L, the indi↵erence curve defined by reservation payo↵ of the government
must have a unique intersection point with the highest possible indi↵erence curve of the
coalition that is tangent to the indi↵erence curve defined by the government’s reservation
payo↵. This unique point is defined as sL that maximizes the utility of the coalition subject
to the government receiving its reservation payo↵.
For an o↵er sL that the coalition makes let qˆ(sL) be the probability with which the state
of the world is one where the reservation payo↵ of the government is greater than Ug(sL),
and the o↵er is rejected. Hence the maximization problem for the coalition simplifies to
max
s2,{s1...s2X}
(1  qˆ(s))Uc(s) + qˆ(s)Uc(s). (10)
Since the maximization is over a finite set of vectors, a maximum exists. It is generically
unique. If there are more global maxima, we pick the one that maximizes 1   qˆ(s), the
probability of acceptance.
Finally to see that qˆ(s⇤) > 0 note that qˆ(s⇤) = 0 is true only when the coalition o↵ers
s = s. Since ⇥ = ✓ with positive probability, the coalition can improve its expected payo↵
by o↵ering any sL as this is accepted with a positive probability.
5 Empirics
We have collected data on X⇤ and Y ⇤, the number of bills and ordinances passed in each
session and the corresponding break, from 1952 to 2007. In addition to this we also have data
on the exact dates on which each ordinance was promulgated. We take testable implications
1 and 2 to the data. See table 1 for the summary statistics.
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Testable Implication 1 To begin with in table 2 we observe that there is a systematic
di↵erence in legislative performance under majority and minority governments. Majority
governments promulgate fewer ordinances per session and enact more bills in parliament.
This is true even after controlling for the length of the break.
In table 3 we take testable implication 1 to the data by regressing
Y ⇤t = ↵+  X
⇤
t +  Controlst + ✏t, (11)
where X⇤t is the number of bills passed in session t and Y ⇤t is the number of ordinances
promulgated in the subsequent break. In this table we run the regression separately for the
sub-samples of sessions with majority and minority governments. In Panel A and we find
that there is a negative relationship between the number of bills passed in a session and the
number of ordinances promulgated in the subsequent break. In Panel B we perform the same
regression for the sub sample of sessions where the government in power had majority, and
we see that no such relationship exists. In each year there are typically three sessions of
parliament – spring, monsoon, and winter. In column (2) we control for Season dummies and
to control for any within year cyclical variation in pattern of ordinance making.
It is possible that some minority governments are very active in promulgating ordinance
and this drives our results. In column (3) we control for Lok Sabha dummies which is a
dummy for each government that has been in power in our sample period. We see that the
results in Panel A and B are robust to this inclusion. In column (4) we include year dummies
and this is a more stringent specification than (3) since the Lok Sabha only changes once
every 5 years. We see that the negative correlation for minority governments remains robust
to this inclusion and is therefore unlikely to be driven by variation in ordinance making that
comes from there being greater or fewer ordinances in a given year.
It is natural that the length of time in a break is positively a↵ects the number of ordinances
that are promulgated. If the number of bills in a session is somehow correlated with the length
of the subsequent break, our results may be biased. To address this concern, in column (5)
we control for the length of the break and find that our results are robust to its inclusion.
Finally in columns (6) and (7) we include the entire battery of controls together and find
that our results are una↵ected. Note that we cannot control Lok Sabha dummies and Year
dummies in the same regression since the Year dummies subsume changes of government over
time.
Classifying Governments We wish to examine whether there is a systematic di↵erence
in the pattern of ordinance making by majority and minority governments. We define majority
government to be one where the party that forms the government has more than 50% seats
in the Lok Sabha. A concern with this definition is that it is possible that there are coalition
majority governments that are classified as minority governments even though the parties in
the coalition together have over 50% of the seats. When defining minority governments this
way we need to be mindful of the possibility that the mechanics of our model may not apply
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to such coalition governments since the parties within the government may have decided on
legislative bargain at the start when they come together to form the government. As a result
it may be more appropriate to classify these as minority governments instead. In India the
only government that would potentially change its classification from minority to majority if
we use this definition is the Janata Government from the 6th Lok Sabha which held o ce
between March 1977 to August 1979.7 In table 3 we run the regressions from table 2 after
changing the classification of majority/minority governments in line with this discussion. We
see that the results are robust to this change in classification. All other coalition governments
in India were minority governments
Finally in table 4 run the following regression:
Y ⇤t = ↵+  X
⇤
t +  X
⇤
t ⇤ SLP Seatst +  SLP Seatst +  Controlst + ✏t, (12)
where SLP Seats is the fraction of seats held by the single largest party. Using the interaction
term in this regression we attempt to test whether the negative relationship between bill and
ordinances diminishes as the share of seats held by the single largest party increases. This
may be true since a minority government with close to 50% seats may find it easier to bargain
with potential allies. On the other hand the failure of bargaining is likely to be more common
for a minority government that is well short of the 50% mark as it need to convince more
allies to forge a successful coalition.8 If this is the case we expect   to be negative but   to
be positive. This is what we find in table 4.
Repromulgating Ordinances Ordinances are temporary legislation; to become perma-
nent they must be approved in Parliament. Article 123 mandates that ordinances must be
presented before both Houses of Parliament, and ratified within six weeks from the day Parlia-
ment reconvenes again. Otherwise, ordinances cease to operate. They may also be withdrawn
by the President, or may lapse. While ordinances clearly require parliamentary ratification to
become permanent, there are two ways by which they may become quasi-permanent without
such approval.
First, consider the possibility of re-promulgation. Article 123 is silent about it. The
Supreme Court has taken the view that the Council of Ministers may re-promulgate an or-
dinance under limited circumstances (D. C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar 1987). Consequently,
ministers may prolong the life of an ordinance simply by re-promulgating it after the reassem-
bled Parliament goes away from session once again. Secondly, the court has also taken the
view that if an ordinance ceases to operate, all o cial actions done or initiated during the
time, the ordinance was in force will remain permanently valid (State of Orissa v Bhupendra
7The case of Janata Government in 1977 is somewhat ambiguous as it formed a coalition minority government
to start with but was soon allied with Congress for Democracy which joined the government leading to the coalition
have over 50% of the seats in Lok Sabha.
8We prefer to use these results as robustness checks rather than as our baseline specification since it is possible
that the single largest party may not be part of the government. This has happened only once – the BJP was the
single largest party in the 11th Lok Sabha (1996-98) but sat in the opposition.
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Bose 1962). Both these are important mechanisms by which to prolong the life of an ordi-
nance, or confer permanence on actions taken under it. And this has important implications
for how governments may invoke Article 123. Because a failed ordinance can generate perma-
nent outcomes, governments may resort to the mechanism in the full knowledge that it would
not be able to convert the ordinance into an Act of Parliament. This is particularly true of
minority governments that by definition lack majority support in Parliament; the ability to
achieve legislative objectives even under a failed ordinance is likely to incentivise governments
in favour of more.
By its very nature a repromulgation implies that the original legislative necessity arose
before the session of parliament, and the consequently the government had a full session to
convert the ordinance into parliamentary legislation. Hence it appears that the executive is
overreaching its power when it repromulgates ordinances as and when they cease to operate.
It is interesting to note that all the 59 instances of repromulgation of ordinances have occurred
during the tenures of minority governments. This strongly suggests that ordinances are being
used in a way that is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate in Article 123.
Converting Ordinances The other mechanism to ensure that an ordinance becomes
permanent is to convert an ordinance into an act of parliament by presenting it before parlia-
ment and calling for a vote. One way of testing whether minority governments use ordinances
only in cases where immediate action is required is to see if there is a di↵erence in the number
of ordinances that are converted into bills by parliament when it reconvenes. If ordinances
are being used in a way consistent with the constitutional mandate in Article 123 we ought
not to expect any systematic di↵erence in their conversion based on whether they are pro-
mulgated by majority or minority governments. On the other hand if minority governments
use ordinances as a substitute legislative route for lawmaking within parliament, the model
from 3 would apply, and following testable implication 1 we expect minority governments to
be less successful in converting ordinances into parliamentary legislations.
In table 6 we test this by regressing
Unconverted Ordinancest = ↵+  Majority Govtt +  Controlst + ✏t, (13)
where Unconverted Ordinancet is the di↵erence between the number of ordinances promul-
gated in the previous break and the number of ordinances that are passed as parliamentary
legislation in session t. In columns (1) to (4) we observe that majority governments have
fewer unconverted ordinances than minority governments. This is true after including Season
dummies, the length of session t, and the length of the break in t  1 when the ordinances in
question were promulgated.9
One concern with these results above is that these results are driven by the fact that
9Note that the number of observations drops since we exclude the contiguous break-session observations where
the government has changed. Note also that in this regression we cannot control for Year or Lok Sabha dummies
as these are collinear with the Majority Government variable.
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majority governments pass fewer ordinances, and consequently have fewer ordinances to con-
vert into parliamentary legislations in the subsequent interval. We attempt to address this in
columns (4) to (8) by using the fraction of ordinances that remain unconverted as our depen-
dent variable. We observe that the all results remain significant at the 1% level indicating
that minority governments are able to convert a smaller fraction of the ordinances they pass
into parliamentary legislations.
Testable Implication 2 Finally we examine the timing of ordinances within breaks for
majority and minority governments. Figure 1 shows the distribution of ordinances over the
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Figure 1: Majority Governments
proportion of time elapsed from the start of the break for majority governments.10 Given
testable implication 2 we expect to see ordinances being randomly placed within a break for
majority governments whereas for minority governments we expect them to be concentrated
at the start of the break. In figure 2 we observe that this is indeed the case. To examine this
further we run the following regression:
Yt = ↵i +  Days Elapsed Since start of the Breakt + ✏t, (14)
where Yt is number of ordinances passed on day t. We regress this on the number of days on
day t that have elapsed since the start of the break. We control for session dummies ↵i, which
10The number of ordinances is aggregates across all breaks under majority governments. For example, the number
of ordinances on .2 represents the total ordinances across all breaks under majority governments that were passed
on the day when 20% of the days from the start of the break had elapsed.
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Figure 2: Minority Governments
account for things such as di↵erences in the total number of ordinances passed in each break.
The results presented in table 8 strongly support testable implication 2. We observe that the
number of ordinances is declining in the number of days elapsed for minority governments
and no such relationship exists when we run the regression for majority governments. In
column (2) we change the regressor to the proportion of days elapsed from the start of the
break to account for di↵erences in the length of breaks, and we observe that our results are
una↵ected by this. In column (3) we find that our results are robust to performing a negative
binomial regression. This is reassuring since our dependent variable is a count variable that
is positively skewed with many zeros as there are no ordinances passed on large fraction of
the days in a break. In columns (4) and (5) we change our dependent variable to one that
takes value 1 when there is at least one ordinance passed on the day and zero otherwise. This
is to check whether our results are driven by a few outlier days where many ordinances are
passed. We observe that this doesn’t change our results, both with the OLS regression and
the Logit regression.11
A potential problem with the results presented in table 8 is that we assume that the
relationship between the number of ordinances passed on a day and the number of days
elapsed from the start of the break is linear. To relax this assumption run
Yt = ↵i +  Dt + ✏t, (15)
11We prefer Logit here since we have Overall Session Dummies. Estimating this with Probit would create the
incidental parameter problem.
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where Dt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if less than 20% of the break has elapsed on
date t and zero otherwise. Given testable implication 2 we expect   is positive for only for
minority governments as they rush to promulgate ordinances as when the break commences.
We see that this is indeed true in columns (1) and (2) as the estimates for   are positive and
significant. Indeed we find that the estimates for   for majority governments are negative
and significant indicating that in fact majority governments are less likely to pass ordinances
at the start of the break. In columns (3) and (4) we change the threshold for Dt to 25%, and
in columns (5) and (6) we change it to 30% and observe that the results remain unchanged.
6 Conclusion
The Indian constitution allows the executive to pass laws in events where immediate action
is required and the parliament is not in session. We have shown that this provision has
been abused by governments to enact their legislative agenda by bypassing parliamentary
scrutiny when they lack the support in parliament. We have constructed a simple model
that features failure of negotiation between minority governments and potential coalition
partners leading to governments using the ordinance route. This model predicts a negative
relationship between parliamentary legislations and ordinances for minority governments, a
pattern that is borne out in our empirical results. Consistent with the model we also find
that minority governments are more likely to fail in converting ordinances into parliamentary
legislations. Finally minority governments are also more likely to pass ordinances at the start
of the break indicating that they use ordinances to act on legislative necessities that arose
when parliament was in session.
Our results contribute to the literature on the di↵erences in the behavior of minority
and majority governments. They show that minority governments may compensate for their
weakness in the legislature by attempting to substitute out legislative functioning through
exercise of executive power. Although this behavior may be welfare enhancing since it allows
minority governments to find a way out of potential legislative dysfunction, it also allows
them to make fewer e↵orts to forge a consensus or at least a working majority in parliament.
This may create long run institutional costs as executive power is strengthened at the expense
of the legislature.
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A Text of Article 123
123. Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament
1. If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is
satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate
action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him to require
2. An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and e↵ect as an
Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance
(a) shall be laid before both House of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the
expiration of six weeks from the reassemble of Parliament, or, if before the expi-
ration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon
the passing of the second of those resolutions; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President Explanation Where the Houses of
Parliament are summoned to reassemble on di↵erent dates, the period of six weeks
shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause
3. If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament
would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.
B Graphs and Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bills by Session 175 19.57143 9.129609 0 47
Ordinances by Breaks 177 3.440678 3.655341 0 24
Length of Session 177 52.62147 29.55385 2 192
Length of Break 176 62.96023 24.46954 3 175
Unconverted Ordinances 175 .8171429 2.128283 0 13
Majority Govt 177 .5310734 .5004492 0 1
Fraction of Single Largest Party Seats 177 .5675691 .1758702 .271331 .752809
Ordinance per day in Break 20748 .0293522 .2244432 0 8
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Table 2: Executive and Legislative Outcomes under Minority Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total ordinances in the break Total bills by parliament in session
Majority Govt -.947451* -.8889939* 5.257857***
(.5529791) (.5247203) (1.345532)
Fraction of seats of SLP -2.854867* -2.558356* 14.48368***
(1.556254) (1.487466) (3.767059)
Constant 3.986667*** .8467139 5.061012*** 1.82578 16.50685*** 11.34674***
(.4197804) (.7903912) (.9244861) (1.149126) (1.027248) (2.239939)
Length of Break .0496937*** .0490913***
(.0106156) (.0106341)
N 177 176 177 176 175 175
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Substitution of Parliamentary Legislation with Ordinances
Dependent Variable: Total ordinances in the break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Minority Govt
Number of Bills -.1114341** -.1018251* -.1007348** -.1332727** -.1247936** -.0910595* -.1144802*
(.0482358) (.0540344) (.0463468) (.0541462) (.0481324) (.0512749) (.0573727)
N 73 73 73 73 72 72 72
Panel B: Majority Govt
Number of Bills .0533783 .0568724 .0093442 -.0266432 .0288032 -.0081056 -.01595
(.0404045) (.0413824) (.0412552) (.0464694) (.0356576) (.0376351) (.0417747)
N 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Season Dummies - X - - - X X
Lok Sabha Dummies - - X - - X -
Year Dummies - - - X - - X
Length of Break - - - - X X X
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Substitution of Parliamentary Legislation with Ordinances
Dependent Variable: Total ordinances in the break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Minority Govt
Number of Bills -.1076139** -.1011696* -.1005858* -.1344457** -.1228361** -.0944299* -.1159006*
(.0526736) (.0584264) (.0502259) (.0578717) (.0530871) (.0552675) (.0606523)
N 62 62 62 62 61 61 61
Panel B: Majority Govt
Number of Bills .0469605 .0532927 .0030742 -.0310891 .0287989 -.0078087 -.0161005
(.0379715) (.0391807) (.0391222) (.0443127) (.0332427) (.0358709) (.0398534)
N 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Season Dummies - X - - - X X
Lok Sabha Dummies - - X - - X -
Year Dummies - - - X - - X
Length of Break - - - - X X X
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Substitution of Parliamentary Legislation with Ordinances
Dependent Variable: Total ordinances in the break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Bills -.2437159** -.2469817** -.207106** -.247274** -.2785918*** -.225123** -.2631836**
(.0983739) (.1002205) (.0980536) (.1088219) (.0928355) (.0939159) (.1015459)
Number of Bills X .404719** .41406** .3013192* .3090627 .4301648*** .3079587* .3424841*
Fraction of seats of SLP (.1731946) (.1748901) (.1718169) (.1879924) (.1630364) (.1628053) (.1742447)
Fraction of seats of SLP -10.02547*** -10.23244*** -9.870688***
(3.60342) (3.636859) (3.398933)
N 175 175 175 175 174 174 174
Season Dummies - X - - - X X
Lok Sabha Dummies - - X - - X -
Year Dummies - - - X - - X
Length of Break - - - - X X X
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Conversion of Ordinances into Parliamentary Legislations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unconverted Ordinances from the Previous Break Unconverted Ordinances from the Previous Break /
Total Ordinances from the Previous Break
Majority Govt -1.051218*** -1.050285*** -1.020756*** -1.043408*** -.1807304*** -.1776933*** -.1783146*** -.1761177***
(.2749193) (.2750933) (.2758435) (.2748403) (.0475689) (.0475417) (.0479611) (.047866)
Length of Session -.0073781 -.0075121 -.0004067 -.0003937
(.0061913) (.0061612) (.0010752) (.0010744)
Lag Length of Break .0111815 .0010844
(.0069779) (.0012177)
Constant 1.38806*** 1.473252*** 2.054124*** 1.462462** .2797947*** .2243645*** .1979785* .2553587**
(.2105278) (.2927989) (.5684192) (.6754528) (.0364274) (.0506016) (.1178701) (.0986355)
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Season Dummies - X X X - X X X
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Timing of Odinances Within a Break
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of ordinances on the day Ordinance Dummy
OLS OLS N.Binom OLS Logit
Panel A: Minority Govt
Days Elapsed -.0007537*** -.0132464*** -.0004781*** -.0121872***
(.0002127) (.0034518) (.0001278) (.003089)
Prop Days Elapsed -.0774409***
(.0176137)
N 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888
Panel B: Majority Govt
Days Elapsed .000326 .0054407 .0001888 .0043083
(.0001802) (.0032812) (.0001337) (.0031039)
Prop Days Elapsed .0303222*
(.0137357)
N 4915 4915 4915 4915 4852
All regressions have Overall Session Dummies
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Timing of Odinances Within a Break
Dependent Variable: Number of ordinances on the day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS N. Binomial OLS N. Binomial OLS N. Binomial
Panel A: Minority Govt
First 20% .0308005** .4105519**
(.0120787) (.1830351)
First 25% .0268619** .4050276**
(.0110459) (.1714999)
First 30% .0303865*** .3971525**
(.0104341) (.1620053)
N 5115 5115 5115 5115 5115 5115
Panel B: Majority Govt
First 20% -.0126337* -.3395034*
(.0070309) (.1837627)
First 25% -.0172133*** -.4636239***
(.0064239) (.1716318)
First 30% -.0159272*** -.4163045***
(.0060717) (.1577444)
N 7509 7509 7509 7509 7509 7509
All regressions have Overall Session Dummies
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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